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Glacier Lake 513, Peru: Lessons for 
early warning service development
By Christian Huggel1, Alejo Cochachin2, Fabian Drenkhan1,3,4, Javier Fluixá-Sanmartín5, Holger Frey1, 
Javier García Hernández5, Christine Jurt6, Randy Muñoz1, Karen Price7, Luis Vicuña1
Glacier shrinkage – accelerated over the last decades 
due to climate change – is exposing large areas 
in mountain regions worldwide. But an even dire 
consequence of the melting ice is the forming of more 
glacier lakes, which are increasing in size. Glacial lakes 
have caused some of the world’s most devastating 
floods, for example, in the Andes, Himalayas and Alps, 
where thousands of human lives were lost and huge 
infrastructure damages reported (Carrivick and Tweed, 
2013; Bajracharya et al., 2007; Carey 2005). Climate 
change is rapidly reshaping living conditions in high 
mountains – altering flood patterns and creating new 
flood hazards – leaving populations at imminent risk 
in several regions (Cook et al., 2016; Emmer et al., 
2015; Frey et al., 2016; Drenkhan e al., 2019). 1 2 34 5 67
Climatic, glaciological and hydrological information 
and services can play an essential role for early 
detection of potential hazards and risks, and for 
effectively reducing risks. However, infrastructure 
for climate and associated services are poorly 
developed in many high mountain areas and need 
to be substantially strengthened. This report on the 
design, implementation, operation and circumstances 
around the setting up of an early warning system for 
glacier lake outburst floods (GLOFs) in the Peruvian 
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Andes highlights the challenges related to accessing 
and installing equipment in many high mountains 
regions. 
Laguna 513 disaster
The Cordillera Blanca in the tropical Andes of Peru 
is a glaciated mountain range with a long history of 
disastrous GLOF events (Carey 2005; 2010). GLOF 
risks result from considerable physical hazard levels 
and the high levels of vulnerability and exposure of 
downstream populations (Frey et al., 2018). The Laguna 
513 glacier lake (9°12’45’’S, 77°33’00’’W) is located at 
4 428 metres (m) above sea level at the foot of Mount 
Hualcán (6 104 m) in the Santa River basin (Figs. 1, 2). 
The lake, which formed in the late 1960s as a result 
of glacier shrinkage, was declared highly dangerous 
in 1988 and subjected to exhaustive security works 
to artificially lower its level by some 20 m until 1994. 
This did not reduce GLOFs risk to zero, though the 
probability of occurrence and magnitude of GLOFs 
was substantially lowered. In 2004, authorities and 
specialists produced a report indicating that the lake 
could be considered safe due to the infrastructure in 
place (INDECI 2004; Muñoz et al. 2016).
Site location: a) Peru, b) Cordillera Blanca and c) the 
Hualcán-Carhuaz area (in dashed line). 
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However, Laguna 513 was heavily impacted when a 
450 000 cubic metres (m3) rock-ice avalanche detached 
from the southwest slope of Mt. Hualcán (Carey et al., 
2012) (Fig. 2) on 11 April 2010, at about 8 a.m. local 
time. The avalanche caused a tsunami-like push-wave 
on the lake, resulting in a dam spillover despite the 
over 20 m freeboard. Traces of the wave indicate an 
overtopping of the dam by about 5 m – corresponding 
to a wave height of about 24 to 25 m – with a peak 
discharge of rate of several tens of thousands m3 per 
second (Schneider et al., 2014). The resulting GLOF 
damaged several bridges, water service infrastructure 
along its trajectory and eventually reached the debris 
fan of the city of Carhuaz (about 20 000 inhabitants), 
where the coarse material of the GLOF was deposited. 
A total of 0.7 km2 of agricultural land was buried and 
the Santa Valley highway was affected, but no lives 
were lost.
Local and national authorities, as well as Peruvian and 
international experts, met in the weeks following the 
disaster to discuss ways to better protect people and 
their assets in future incidents. As a result, plans for a 
GLOF Early Warning System (EWS) were initiated in 
2011 and implemented within three years. The GLOF 
EWS, the first in the Andean region, was established 
in the framework of the Glacier Project (www.
proyectoglaciares.pe) with financial support from 
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC). CARE Peru and the University of Zurich jointly 
implemented the EWS in close collaboration with 
the municipality of Carhuaz and the National Water 
Authority of Peru (ANA) and its Office for Glacier 
and Lake Evaluations (former Glaciology and Water 
Resources Unit  - UGRH) in Huaraz. 
Development and implementation  
of a GLOF Early Warning System
The design, organization and operation of the 
GLOF was structured to adhere to internationally 
recognized EWS components (cf. Fluixá-Sanmartín 
et al., 2018):
1. risk knowledge
2. monitoring and warning
3. dissemination and communication
4. response capability. 
Overview map of Lake 513 and 
Carhuaz, indicating the 2010 ice 
avalanche source zone producing 




Understanding the risks encountered at a particular 
location is fundamental for the design of an EWS. 
Risks can be assessed using established methods 
that analyze physical hazards by means of critical 
indicators and thresholds (in this case related to the 
different components involved in the GLOF process), 
exposure of people and assets (e.g. infrastructure) 
and the vulnerability (e.g. social, economic) of the 
elements at risk. Comprehensive risk assessments 
for GLOFs are rare (Allen et al., 2016) and complex 
because GLOFs are typically the results of a cascade 
of triggering and propagating mass flow processes 
(Schneider et al., 2014; Westoby et al., 2014). 
The 2010 GLOF served as a reference to analyze the 
physical hazards by simulating the process cascade 
with an iterative approach of coupled, physically-based 
numerical mass movement and hydrodynamic models 
(RAMMS and IBER). This model chain was then used 
to simulate three potential future scenarios of different 
magnitudes (small, medium, large) and corresponding 
probabilities of occurrence (high, medium, low, 
respectively). This hazard assessment procedure 
followed international standards and was in line with 
the recently established guidelines of the International 
Commission on Glacier and Permafrost Hazards in 
Mountains (www.gaphaz.org), a joint commission of 
the International Association of Cryopsheric Sciences 
(IACS) and the International Permafrost Association 
(IPA). The modelling, together with field surveys, 
resulted in a GLOF hazard map for local communities 
and city of Carhuaz (Schneider et al., 2014) (Fig. 3). 
Exposure and vulnerability were assessed using 
publicly available data sources (such as census data) 
and additional surveys in the catchments. 
However, risks are perceived in very different ways by 
different actors. It is a challenge to understand and 
take these differences in perception into consideration 
but this is essential for wide user acceptance and 
the long term success of risk reduction measures. 
Repeated workshops were conducted in the different 
communities of the catchment to learn about the 
risk perceptions and priorities of local leaders and 
people. At a later stage, ethnographic studies, which 
included longer (several months) research visits 
with the local communities, were also conducted in 
the catchment. These were important to gain more 
in-depth understanding of how local people perceive 
their natural environment, and the relationships they 
maintain with mountains, glaciers and lakes that 
surround them. This led to a deeper understanding 
of how they perceived the diverse types of risks and 
how they understood the connections between those 
risks and those involved in the GLOF EWS project. 
Thereby cultural and political aspects were highlighted 
and people’s concerns about water came to the fore, 
that is water availability, mostly in terms of access to 
water (e.g. water rights, allocation).
Monitoring and warning
Monitoring and warning are central elements of an 
EWS. Monitoring instruments and technical measuring 
must be set up to detect hazards so that timely 
warnings can be issued. The challenge is to identify 
the environmental processes and variables that are 
critical to the early detection of an extreme event (such 
as a GLOF) – and that are measurable by sensors. The 
insights and improved understanding of the processes 
gained from the reconstruction of the 2010 outburst 
and the modelling of potential future scenarios (risk 
knowledge element) served to identify where and 
what to measure and monitor. Knowledge about GLOF 
travel times – from triggering to reaching population 
centres – are, for instance, critical for the design of 
an EWS and for later visualization and planning with 
local authorities and communities (see “Dissemination 
and communication”). 
Reference projects for GLOF EWS were rare at the 
time of the design for Laguna 513 (2011/2012), and 
completely non-existent for the Latin American region. 
The “art” in such a design is in taking account of all 
possible flood trigger processes while measuring the 
point that still allows for timely warning. The different 
types of flood trigger processes – ice avalanches, 
moraine instabilities, rock slope failures – strongly 
depend on local conditions. It is critical to adequately 
understand the physical environment and interplay of 
processes that can result in different GLOF scenarios. 
The harsh, extreme physical environment in which 
glacier lakes (as origin of GLOFs) form are often the 
biggest challenge. At high altitudes, such as that 
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of Laguna 513, there are large daily temperature 
fluctuations, long periods of cloudiness, heavy 
precipitation and high solar radiation as well as a 
steep topography in what is a remote environment. All 
of these factors need to be considered in the design 
and implementation. The GLOF EWS adventurer/
scientists had to make provisions for reduced energy, 
for complications with data transmission from the 
sensors and the limited access for sensor installation 
and frequent following-up and maintenance. 
Another crucial element for monitoring and warning, 
in particular for an EWS in extreme environments 
such as in this case, is the redundancy in the system. 
Even in a well-calibrated and tested EWS, a sensor 
or data transmission failure is likely to occur at some 
point, sufficient redundancy is indispensable to avoid 
that sensor failure results in EWS failure as a whole. 
An addition problem is funding the long term 
maintenance of the EWS. Small municipalities with 
limited budget have other priorities like investing in 
health and education services.
With the knowledge and information gathered, the 
local and international team worked together, each 
contributing their expertise, to design an EWS that 
would overcome the challenges of Laguna 513. The 
design comprised two stations – a main station at the 
Laguna 513 dam and a station in the Pampa Shonquil, 
which would include meteorological measuring 
instruments – a data centre in the municipality of 
Carhuaz, a warning station in the community of 
Pariacaca, and a repeater station for transferring the 
signal from the lake to the data centre (Fig. 3).
The stations were equipped with the following 
instruments:
1. Data centre Carhuaz (2 640 m a.s.l.): receiving 
antenna, screen with real-time data access, server 
for data storage, infrastructure for launching 
alarms. 
2. Repeater station (3 189 m a.s.l.): receiving and 
sending antenna.
3. Station Laguna 513 (4 491 m a.s.l.): 2 cameras 
taking photos every 5 seconds during daylight 
times, one looking at the face of Mt. Hualcán, one 
observing the dam. 4 geophones located close to 
the station, continuously measuring and sending 
data in 5 second intervals, in order to detect 
potential mass movements (e.g. ice avalanche) 
impacting the lake. Receiving and sending antenna 
and data logger.
4. Station Pampa Shonquil (3 600 m a.s.l.): river 
discharge station (using pressure sensor), 
meteorological station with sensors for measuring 
Stations and receiving 
centre of the Lake 513 
EWS: from left to right: 
station at Lake 513, at 
Pampa Shonquil  and 
repeater, and the data 
receiving centre at the 
municipality of Carhuaz. 
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air temperature and humidity, precipitation, wind 
speed, and solar radiation. Sending antenna and 
data logger.
5. Information receiving and warning station at 
Pariacaca (3 138 m a.s.l.): the monitoring system 
informs locals about events at Laguna 513 and 
sirens activated from the Data Centre Carhuaz to 
facilitate evacuation.
All stations were equipped with solar panels and 
batteries for energy generation and storage, however 
energy availability remained a limiting factor, in 
particular at the glacier lake station as the peaks of 
the Cordillera Blanca experience a high frequency of 
cloud coverage. Each station had a mast where most 
of the instruments were fixed, a concrete lockable 
box for the electronic equipment, and a protective 
fence. Emergency power aggregates were available 
in the municipal building to prevent data losses and 
interrupted access during blackouts. 
The geophones (devices recording ground movements 
and converting them into voltage) were the principle 
instruments used for registering a potential GLOF 
trigger. The back-up cameras could be used to get an 
overview of the current situation and, particularly during 
the test phase of the system, for relating geophone 
measurements to the magnitude of (avalanche) events. 
The pressure sensor in the riverbed at the Pampa 
Shonquil station added redundancy to the system 
and, if calibration measurements were taken, could 
be used to continuously record runoff. Later, it was 
planned to install wire sensors in the river channel 
bed below Laguna 513 that would detect unusually 
high and dangerous river flow discharge, which could 
be applied in debris flow warning systems. 
A permanently manned hut with wardens next to the 
station at Pampa Shonquil was an important element 
of the EWS, especially for consideration of redundancy. 
Its main purpose was to control the freshwater intake 
for the municipality of Carhuaz but the location gave 
the wardens a perfect view towards Laguna 513, they 
could radio warnings to the authorities in case of an 
event (as was the case in the 2010 event). 
For security, all data is first stored in the data logger at 
each respective station, then transmitted at 5-second 
intervals to the data centre server, which has a cloud 
back-up. All data are directly transferred to a website 
that permits real-time remote access. In the data 
centre itself – a separate office in the municipality of 
Carhuaz – a screen continuously displays the data 
from this webpage.
Warning protocols represent essential elements of an 
EWS. The protocol documents and defines warning 
procedures, typically differentiating a number of 
warning levels and associated actions as well as the 
responsible institutions, organizations or committees 
and people. Local, regional and national laws, rules 
and guidelines had to be taken into consideration in 
the Laguna 513 warning protocol. The members of 
the Local Emergency Operation Centre, civil defense, 
selected government officials and the mayor, whose 
authority it is to launch the evacuation alarm, had to be 
involved. Accordingly, the protocol was accompanied 
by a list of responsible persons and their phone 
numbers. It defined three warning levels – yellow, 
orange and red – plus a normal green baseline level 
and how these warning levels are reached and what 
type of actions need to be taken. To this purpose, 
thresholds of physical variables and processes had 
to be determined based on sensor measurements. 
Definition of these thresholds is critical and involves 
an extended period of calibration and testing, typically 
of many months, especially if no prior measurements 
are available as in the case of Laguna 513.  
Dissemination and communication
If measurements on a geophone surpasses a defined 
threshold, a short message to immediately check 
EWS data and information is automatically sent to 
the mobile phones of all the responsible personnel 
identified in the warning protocol. The subsequent 
steps to be taken are based on the action plan and 
on the available data. Alarms cannot be automatically 
launched by the EWS because, under Peruvian law, 
only the mayor can authorize an evacuation.
Carhuaz’s alarm module has two long-range acoustic 
sirens and the capacity to send predefined text 
messages to community and district leaders and 
stakeholders such as school principals, hospital chiefs, 
the police and firefighters. Communities upstream of 
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Carhuaz receive warnings and associated information 
through the Local Emergency Operation Centre and 
the central authorities of Carhuaz. Pariacaca, which 
is on the flood pathway, has a warning station with 
sirens. Furthermore, the EWS protocols were adapted 
to fit with the Peruvian protocols for risk assessment, 
allowing communication with the National Emergency 
Operations Centre at Lima to ask for help (Muñoz et 
al. 2016).
Response capability
The ability of people at risk to appropriately respond to 
the levels of warning issued is possibly the most critical 
element of an EWS – it is also the most susceptible to 
failure as the last element of the EWS chain. Failures 
or errors along the monitoring and warning chain 
have to be accommodated such that this last element 
is not adversely affected or threatened.
For the Laguna 513 EWS, information sessions were 
held with the population at risk. During these, the 
concept and functionality of the EWS, as well as its 
potentials and limitations, and clear instructions on 
actions that have to be taken in case of an alarm were 
explained and discussed. The instructions include 
the directive to immediately escape the endangered 
zones, and a clear indication of the evacuation routes 
and safety zones. A detailed map with all evacuation 
routes was prepared by the civil defense of Carhuaz 
on the basis of the hazard map developed in the risk 
knowledge phase of the EWS GLOF design. Emergency 
simulations are scheduled several times a year for the 
entire country as Peru’s seismic risk is very high. Such 
simulations, some of them taking place at nighttime, 
have been used to expose both the population as well 
as the responsible authorities to a test evacuation und 
near-realistic conditions, and to familiarize them with 
the EWS of Laguna 513.
Operational aspects and lessons learned
In 2010, when discussions and activities related 
to the GLOF EWS started, Carhuaz was the main 
local actor and the centre for data and information 
reception. However, the technical, operational and 
social dimensions of the EWS were beyond the capacity 
of such a small city. Long-standing national and 
international expertise – necessitating regular presence 
on site and permanent joint capacity building and 
exchange with local people and authorities – was 
indispensable to address the challenges. In July 
2015, full responsibility of the EWS was handed over 
to the local authorities in a ceremony attended by 
representatives from the local, provincial and national 
governments of Peru, from the Swiss government, 
and from local communities and schools as well as 
national and international experts. By that time, the 
EWS had made headlines in the Peruvian, Swiss and 
international media. 
In 2016, much of the central tropical Andes, including 
the Cordillera Blanca region, was affected by a strong 
drought. In normal years, after a long dry Austral 
winter season, farmers count on the start of the rainfall 
season in October. In 2016, no rainfall was recorded 
in October and November. 
After first requests to remove the EWS by some local 
inhabitants (cf. Fraser, 2017), farmers got desperate 
and rumors started to spread that the rain gauges and 
antennas of the EWS at Laguna 513 were responsible 
for the lack of rainfall. In a rather dramatic turn of 
events – driven by community-level power policy 
factors and weak communications from authorities 
on the extraordinary meteorological events – a 
large number of locals gathered at Laguna 513 on 
24 November and decided to dismantle the EWS 
station at the lake. Reactions at the local, national 
and international levels were vigorous. There was 
animated disorderly mix of supporters of the EWS 
on social media. Others expressed incomprehension, 
disgust, shame and critiqued the voluntarily exposure 
of lives at risk by this destructive action. 
The destruction of the station affected the monitoring 
and warning components of the EWS from a technical 
and operational point of view. But service could 
be maintained thanks to the wardens located at 
the intermediate site (Pampa Shonquil). Response 
capabilities and institutional mechanisms were not 
affected. However, it was crucial to understand the 
root causes of this action. 
The results of intensive research into the incident, which 
centred on social sciences, are summarized below. The 
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lessons learned are relevant for the development of 
climate and warning services beyond Peru.
• The dismantlement of meteorological and EWS 
stations by local people is not unique to this site, 
nor to Peru. Similar incidents have occurred in 
other regions, such as Himalayas, Andes and 
Alps of Europe, though those experiences were 
poorly documented.
• Local intra and inter-community conflicts, as well 
as distrust and biases against the participation of, 
and installations from, external institutions, can 
have a strong, but invisible, impact on acceptance.
• The relation of local (risk exposed) people to their 
natural environment and their perceptions of 
different risks strongly determines their attitude 
towards risk reduction efforts. Local perspectives 
may differ substantially from government or 
technical and scientific perspectives. For instance, 
local people can have intimate relations with 
mountains, glaciers and lakes as places of 
spirituality and the origin of life. Hence, a GLOF 
may be understood as a reaction of, for example, a 
glacier (as a mountain spirit) and a lake (as a being) 
to human disturbance or inappropriate human 
behavior. Traditional knowledge and narratives 
have to be recognized and acknowledged as 
part of a constructive dialogue and in finding 
acceptable solutions.
• As a consequence, the acquisition of a profound 
understanding of the social, political and cultural 
conditions, particularly in terms of power dynamics, 
is a prerequisite for early warning as well as 
more generally for climate adaptation service 
development. It is necessary for collaboration 
among diverse people, actors and experts, 
including local populations, physical and social 
scientists, engineers, local governments, technical 
governmental institutions, and non-governmental 
organization (NGOs). It is encouraged to give the 
social sciences a more prominent role.
• Authorities often believe that an EWS is primarily 
a technical measuring and data transmission 
system. The recognition that an EWS also consists 
of institutional, social, cultural and political 
components is fundamental because an EWS can 
only be operational if all components fulfill their 
function. Furthermore, it is critical that the local 
authorities and people understand that an EWS 
cannot reduce risks to zero – its main objective is to 
avoid harm to human lives. Therefore, it needs to 
be accompanied by other risk reduction measures, 
in particular appropriate land-use planning.
Conclusion
EWS in extreme environments, such as glacier lakes, 
bring many challenges. The system needs to be 
carefully designed to achieve robust energy provision, 
smooth and reliable data transmission, measurement 
of critical physical variables and the required degree 
of redundancy. Many months of system calibration 
are indispensable. Local authorities must clearly 
understand this. In addition, maintenance of the EWS 
needs to be budgeted annually by the local authorities 
to guarantee the sustainability of the system.
The Laguna 513 EWS has become the model for 
several other EWS in the Peruvian Andes (e.g. Huaraz-
Palcacocha, Urubamba-Chicón) and beyond. While the 
experience and capacity development can be replicated, 
it is also crucial to acknowledge that every location 
is an individual case with special characteristics that 
need appropriate attention. 
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